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2. WOULD IT BE LEGAL FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO
LAUNCH A PREDATOR STRIKE ON OSAMA BIN LADEN IF HE HAS BEEN
TRACKED TO A HOUSE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF KARACHI, PAKISTAN?
I suspect that the legality of any such future strike-after the
fact-would be vigorously debated for years by legal scholars.
Looking at the question from the lens of a strategist, I would judge
that such a strike would be justified and warranted. Bin Laden is,
after all, the figurehead of al Qaeda which brutally attacked the
United States and killed some 3,000 individuals on our home soil. He
and his lieutenants today still publicly and loudly call for the killing of
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Americans and our security partners around the world. A Predator
strike in Karachi to kill bin Laden clearly would be ajustifiable act of
American self-defense. The United States working with Pakistani
counterparts, moreover, has already set a precedent for mounting
Predator strikes in Karachi by years of similar strikes in Pakistan along
the border with Afghanistan. That said, the political consequences
and risks of a strike in Karachi would be high, especially if it caused
substantial civilian casualties, what we euphemistically call "collateral
damage." Karachi is a political center of gravity in Pakistan, and the
United States would have to worry that a Predator strike there could
cause a massive public Pakistani backlash. The Pakistani public would
be angered by the perceived violation of Pakistani sovereignty and
would take to the streets to threaten the stability of the regime in
Islamabad and its relations with Washington.
3. DID MEMBERS OF THEJUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL COMMIT MALPRACTICE IN 2002 BY ADVISING THAT THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS DID NOT APPLY TO AL QAEDA AND THE
TALIBAN?
Whether the advice constituted malpractice is beyond my exper-
tise to say, but I can say that the advice was politically and militarily
foolhardy. As for the politics, an important political aim for American
national security is to diffuse widespread and deep animosity against
the United States in the Arab Middle East which provides a rich
recruitment grounds for al Qaeda. The harsh treatment of al Qaeda
captives contrary to the Geneva Conventions only served to reinforce,
rather than to diffuse, negative and even hostile Arab public opinion.
The United States sought tactical intelligence gains with harsh
interrogation techniques only to lose the more important strategic
competition to politically delegitimize al Qaeda and its militant
Islamic ideology. As for the military aspects, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions with al Qaeda and Taliban captives even though they are
not soldiers of a nation-state would have made good, common sense.
The United States could have used regular Red Cross visits in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 to show humane treatment of captives-
as we now belatedly do-to publicly pressure al Qaeda and the
Taliban to behave likewise with American and other foreign captives
of theirs. Although there is only a slim chance that al Qaeda will
reciprocate, our adherence to the Geneva Conventions nevertheless is
an important component of our attempts to protect our military
personnel and nationals captured by al Qaeda and the Taliban. In
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the end, the Bush administration would have been strategically
smarter-as well as more ethically consistent with American democrat-
ic ideals-had it extended Geneva Conventions protection to al
Qaeda and Taliban from the get-go.
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?
Al Qaeda clearly is a grave threat to the United States as evident
from the bloodbath it inflicted on us on 9/11. Often overlooked
today though is that before 9/11, Hezbollah-which operates hand-
in-hand with Iran-had been the transnational insurgent force with
the most American blood on its hands stemming back to its car
bombings and hostage takings in Lebanon during the 1980s. While
American and international action have seriously disrupted the bin
Laden and al Qaeda old guard leadership, it persists and is betting on
robustly reconstituting along with the resurgent Taliban fortunes in
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, moreover, much like a metastasizing cancer,
is now an ideological umbrella under which younger militant Islamists
in Europe, northern Africa, the Middle East, and Asia gain militant
Islamic legitimacy critical for recruiting and supporting new waves of
jihadists.
While al Qaeda has lacked the means over the past decade to be
an "existential" threat to the United States, it might acquire more
formidable tools in the years ahead. Al Qaeda has its eyes on nuclear
weapons and could most plausibly get them from Pakistani nuclear
stockpiles. A worrisome danger is that militant Islamists in Pakistan's
military could help divert Pakistani nuclear weapons into al Qaeda
hands in the not too distant future. Another grave danger is that the
Taliban could one day roll back into power in Afghanistan and bring
al Qaeda along. The Taliban and al Qaeda could then sponsor a
robust cross-border insurgency to topple the regime in Islamabad to
take full control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons stockpiles. One has to
shudder at the prospect of the catastrophic damage al Qaeda could
inflict on the United States if someday it detonated a handful of
Pakistani nuclear warheads in major American cities like New York,
Boston, Washington, Los Angeles, and Miami. Such a scenario
unfortunately is decidedly in the realm of possibility and one well
worth keeping in mind as the United States and NATO debate their
political, military, and economic efforts in Afghanistan.
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9. WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO IF IT CONFIRMS THAT
IRAN HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
My bet is that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons. The
United States is fully committed in Iraq and Afghanistan and has little
appetite to undertake the military operations needed to severely
disrupt Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Although the Israelis who more
acutely fear Iranian nuclear weapons give their geographic vulnerabil-
ities might lash out and militarily strike Iran, they lack the muscle of
American military which would be necessary to knock back Iran's
nuclear program for years to buy the international community more
time. Iran's movement toward nuclear weapons already is building
pressure on other Middle Eastern states to follow suit with Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Arab Gulf states all now publicly calling
for investment in nuclear power, no doubt to send a not too thinly
veiled threat to Tehran. The grave worry is that an Iran armed with
nuclear weapons would feel immune to American military retaliation
if Tehran launches even more aggressive efforts to spread its influ-
ence through Hezbollah surrogates throughout the Middle East to
include in Saudi Arabia, Palestinian territories, Lebanon, the small
Arab Gulf states, and Iraq.
10. WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S
NUMBER-ONE POWER?
This question is often a preoccupation for political scientists and
some historians. I myself have very little confidence in man's ability to
predict the future. What I can say is that the United States would be
wise to take some pointers on statecraft from the late George F.
Kennan, distinguished diplomat, historian, and intellectual architect
of the American Cold War policy of containment of the Soviet Union.
Kennan recommended prudent principles for American policy, which
I believe are still applicable for our security challenges today. He
argued that first and foremost the United States needs to succeed at
home as a society, polity, and economy if it is to have hefty power in
world affairs. In our international affairs, Kennan urged Americans to
hold ourselves accountable to our moral standards and to be an
exemplar for other nation-states to emulate should they so choose,
but not to try to dictate our ways to the world. He also stressed the
importance of managing international balances of power with
alliances and coalitions and setting policy goals within the reach of
our national power. Kennan argued as early as 1947 that if we did
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these things with confidence, persistence, and patience, we would
eventually prevail in our struggle with the Soviet Union, which he
thought was bound to fail given its own ideological and economic
inefficiencies. If we were to take Kennan's principles to heart and
apply them to our security challenges stemming from militant Islamic
extremism and taking shape among nation-states in the Middle East
and Asia, my guess is that the United States would have a much longer
run as the number-one power on the world stage.
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PART H1: ARTICLE
The following section contains an article by Edward P. Richards,
II, which examines the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's
national response plan for a smallpox bioterrorism attack.
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